This paper investigates whether Japanese banks had been following herd behavior in the domestic loan market from 1975 through 2000. Applying the technique developed by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992, J. of Fin. Econ.) to the data from loans outstanding to different types of borrowers, we obtain evidence indicative of the existence of herding. City banks in Japan had been following a cyclical pattern of herding with one of the peaks around the bubble period in the late 1980s. Adjusting further for herding resulting from rational behavior, irrational herding by city banks was observed only in the bubble period. The results imply that irrational bank behavior in the late 1980s might have contributed to the problems associated with bad loans.
Introduction
The non-performing loan problem is considered to be one of the biggest causes behind the Japanese banking crisis, which has existed since the early 1990s. It is very important to clarify the mechanism behind the accumulation of bad loans because the problem has caused a malfunctioning of the Japanese banking sector and deteriorated the credit channel of Japanese monetary policy.
1 Investigation of the mechanism is also important for other economies with bank-oriented financial systems to draw a lesson from the Japanese experience.
"Irrational herd behavior" by Japanese banks during the bubble period in the late 1980s is often blamed as one of the factors that brought about the accumulation of bad loans. An anecdotal explanation of this phenomenon is that Japanese banks did not exert sufficient monitoring effort, and uniformly pushed forward irrational lending behavior. The fact that bank loans to the real estate sector rapidly increased during the late 1980s is often considered as collateral evidence of this irrational herding. 2 This hypothesis implies that Japanese banks could have practiced better lending behavior, and thus they were responsible for the bad loan problem. This behavioral explanation enjoys significant popularity, especially outside academic circles.
From an empirical point of view, this hypothesis has proven to be quite challenging to substantiate, and several interesting questions can be raised in this regard. First of all, we can question the above hypothesis from the viewpoint of the very existence or non-existence of herding. Indeed herd behavior has been considered as typical behavior of Japanese banks for a long time, for which evidence can easily be obtained, for example, from articles in the Nihon Keizai Shinbun (Nikkei), a Japanese newspaper comparable to the Wall Street Journal. A database search through the Nikkei Telecom 21 Article Search Service indeed yielded 1,437 articles in Nikkei containing the words "yokonarabi (herding)" and "ginko (banks)" from January 1, 1975 through December 31, 2000. 3 However, the information in those articles is based more on anecdotal evidence than empirical evidence. More empirical investigation should be conducted about the existence of herd behavior among Japanese banks. Second, we can doubt the hypothesis above from the viewpoint of "rationality" in herding. As for real estate lending, for example, Ueda [30] states that behind the loan influx, Japanese bank managers had expectations that surging land price levels would be sustainable, and that collateral for loans would not deteriorate, taking into account the favorable economic conditions during the late 1980s. Thus, although banks may have followed herd behavior, the behavior might have been based on this expectation, and therefore rational. 4 Indeed the expectation turned out to be wrong. However, this "rational herding" hypothesis implies that banks were not to blame for the bad loan problem; they were just unfortunate victims having suffered from the problem.
Finally, the irrational herding hypothesis above, together with the accompanying discussion, remind us of the importance of intertemporal comparison. The existence of herding has long been suspected and, as shown above, anecdotal evidence for its existence can be found not only during the bubble period but also during other periods. This may imply that irrational herd behavior has been a natural maxim of Japanese banks for a long time. If the banks had long been following irrational herd behavior, it is unlikely that the behavior brought about the bad loan problem, which emerged only in the 1990s. However, if behavior of Japanese banks during the bubble period was abnormal, and irrational herding was observed only during this frantic period in the late 1980s, it is highly likely that the behavior precipitated the subsequent bad loan problem.
Summarizing the discussion thus far, we should ask three questions as follows, so as to investigate whether the irrational herding hypothesis holds Finance. 4 As a matter of fact, rational herding has been paid a lot of attention in theoretical studies. Herd behavior could rationally result (i) among fund managers with a similar comparative advantage (Falkenstein[12] ); (ii) when there are some kinds of payoff externalities in following the herd (e.g. bank run in Diamond and Dybvig [11] , liquidity in Devenow and Welch [10] , and information production in Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein [13] and Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman [16] ); (iii) from reputation concerns (Scharfstein and Stein [28] ); (iv) based on common information; and (v) through inference from behavior of other agents (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch [5] and Banerjee [3] ). See Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch [6] , Devenow and Welch [10] , and Nakagawa and Uchida [24] for survey.
or not: (1) Has herd behavior existed among Japanese banks in the past, first of all? (2) If so, were banks rational or not in following such a behavior? And (3) was the irrationality (or rationality) observed only in the bubble period or was it a characteristic of Japanese banks consistently observed for a long time? These important questions must be answered based on a formal empirical analysis.
This paper is an attempt to answer the questions raised above. The analysis consists of two stages. First, we will find out the existence or non-existence of herd behavior among Japanese banks. Our methodology is indebted to a study of herd behavior among fund managers. Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny [23] (henceforth LSV) devised an innovative index to measure the extent to which fund managers follow herd behavior in investing in equity. The measure, called the LSV measure, captures the extent to which fund managers deviate from average investment decisions which depend on overall economic conditions to collectively buy or sell specific stocks. Due to its simplicity and economic appeal, the measure gained substantial popularity and was applied to investigate herd behavior in different contexts by a series of studies that followed.
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We applied the measure directly to loans outstanding of individual banks to different industries during the period of 1975 through 2000, for which banks' balance sheet data are available in the Nikkei Needs Company (Bank) Data File. Using the data, we will capture the extent to which Japanese banks deviate from lending policy based on macroeconomic conditions to collectively increase or decrease loans to specific industries in each year. We calculated the measure for a representative type of commercial banks in Japan: city banks. 6 Second, if the existence of herd behavior is confirmed at the first stage, we will further investigate the rationality in the detected herding. Because the LSV measure quantifies banks' collective deviation from overall trends in increasing or decreasing loans outstanding, the measure does not capture banks' behavior that can be rationally explained from a macroeconomic point of view. However, the collective deviation could result from banks' decisions that are rational at an individual industry level. For example, expanded or decreased loan demand due to drastic environmental changes, such as a surge in land prices during the bubble, could have made Japanese banks behave collectively so as to lend to a certain industry. This behavior could be rational and would be captured by the LSV measure. We cannot know whether the detected herding was rational or not, unless we disentangle banks' rational behavior at an industry level, based on these grounds, from what the LSV measure quantifies.
To this end, we regress the extent of banks' collective deviation from average lending decisions on proxies for industry-specific rational factors.
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By using the resulting residual, we create an adjusted LSV herding measure. This adjusted measure quantifies the extent of herding which does not stem from macroeconomic or industry-specific rational reasons. After deriving the adjusted measure for the entire sample period, we will compare the level of this adjusted measure in the bubble period to that in other periods, and see whether Japanese banks followed exceptional behavior only in the bubble period, or whether they had been following consistent behavior throughout the sample period.
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The results from the first stage of the analysis demonstrate the existence of herd behavior among Japanese banks during the sample period. City banks had followed a cyclical herding pattern along with economic fluctuations. Interestingly, herding is observed around the second oil crisis in the late 1970s, during the bubble period in the late 1980s, and during the stagnation period that followed. These results are consistent with our image of banks as being frantic to rush in lending to certain industries.
After disentangling herding which is caused by industry-specific rational factors, the results obtained from the second stage of the analysis show that 7 In the present paper, we use the term irrational herding in a sense that it cannot be explained by proxies for rational factors. It may be the case, however, that banks are rational but do not make investment decisions based on the proxies due to market imperfection, for example. 8 Although it is impossible to empirically specify the exact cause of rational herding, we can at least exclude reasons (i) through (iii) in footnote 4 as causes of herding detected in the present analysis. First, Japanese banks might have had comparative advantage in lending to firms with a specific size or in a specific region. However they were unlikely to have an advantage in lending to a specific industry. As our dataset contains each bank's loans outstanding only at the industry level, we can exclude explanation (i). Second, at an industry level, one bank's lending is not likely to positively affect other banks' lending, which excludes the explanation (ii). Finally, we could not infer bank managers' ability based upon their performance in lending to a particular industry. This allows us to disregard explanation (iii).
most of the herding detected in the first stage of the analysis disappeared through the adjustment. However, a large extent of herd behavior was still observed in the bubble period of the late 1980s. The results indicate that irrational bank behavior might have been exceptionally present during the bubble period. Since city banks have been playing a big role in the Japanese economy for a long time, the results are worthy of special mention.
To confirm this view, we further conducted analysis by closely investigating city banks' lending behavior by industry in the late 1980s. Irrational herding in this period was confirmed by this analysis as well. These results imply that irrational herding might have contributed to the accumulation of bad loans. We may therefore conclude that Japanese banks have got what they deserved.
Finally, for comparison purposes, we applied the measures to regional banks: smaller banks that operate regionally in a smaller scale than city banks. For these banks, herding was consistently and significantly observed throughout the period. Even after adjusting for rational factors, herding among regional banks was still observed. In this sense, regional banks have been more frequently following irrational herd behavior than city banks. This result is consistent with Uchida and Tsutsui [29] 's finding that city banks are more competitive than regional banks in the Japanese loan market.
There is an attempt to clarify whether Japanese banks had been following herd behavior. Based upon Jain and Gupta [19] , Nakagawa and Uchida [24] try to detect the causality relationship in loans outstanding by different types of banks. The latter study found the existence of causality from city banks to regional banks, from long-term credit banks to city banks, and from trust banks to city banks. The focus in that study is thus on herd behavior among different types of Japanese banks. In the present study we are interested in herd behavior among the same type of banks. That paper and the present one thus focus on different aspects of herd behavior, and are not substitutes but complements. This paper demonstrates that the well-known LSV measure can be applied to investigate bank herding. By way of using this measure, we present the first evidence of herd behavior among banks at an individual bank level. To our knowledge, the only empirical papers on bank herding thus far are Jain and Gupta [19] and Nakagawa and Uchida [24] cited above. While they examined causality in loans outstanding aggregated by bank type to find herding between groups of banks, the LSV measure in this paper is calculated using the data of individual banks' loans outstanding. The results thus contain more specific information.
Furthermore, our finding of a cyclical herding pattern is closely related to a stylized fact called the procyclicality in bank lending behavior. As introduced in Berger and Udell [4] , lending often increases significantly during business cycle expansions and then falls considerably during subsequent downturns. The cyclical herding behavior found in the present paper is perfectly in line with this fact and can be considered as a cause of the lending procyclicality. Finally, the present paper contains some theoretical contributions to the existing studies since LSV. We construct a formal procedure to test the statistical significance of the LSV measure. In the literature, some studies pay little attention to statistical testing. There are other studies that use the ordinary t-test, but the test could bring about some bias and is not reliable in small-sample analysis. The present paper formally investigates the testing procedure and proposes a Chi-squared test for the LSV measure which is applicable to small-sample analysis.
The rest of this paper is composed as follows. The subsequent section explains the first stage of our analysis. After introducing the methodology and data, we report the results. Our Chi-squared test is also introduced in this section. In section 3, we extend the second stage of our analysis. After the explanation of the methodology, we present the results. Section 4 is devoted to robustness checks. Regional banks' herd behavior is then investigated in section 5. The final section concludes the paper with some suggestions for future study.
Analysis by LSV herding measure

Methodology
We detect herd behavior among Japanese banks using the herding measure created by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny [23] (LSV). Suppose that in each 9 The focus of Berger and Udell [4] is on a different explanation of the stylized fact, which is called the institutional memory hypothesis. They provide empirical evidence suggesting that this hypothesis can explain the lending procyclicality. However, they mention that herding theory is one of other plausible and concomitant explanations for the procyclicality (Berger and Udell[4, p.493]). As for procyclicality and herding in banking context, see theoretical studies of Rajan [26] , Acharya [1] , Acharya and Yorulmazer [2] , and Pennacchi [25] as well.
year indexed by t, banks have loans outstanding to industries j. For notational simplicity, we denote by i the index of each industry-year which is defined by a combination of one t and one j. The LSV herding measure is defined as follows.
P i is the proportion of banks who actually increased their loans outstanding in industry-year i (of industry j in year t). P i is derived as,
where N i and X i are the numbers of banks that were active in the industryyear i, and that increased loans outstanding in the industry-year i, respectively. P t is the expected proportion of banks that increased their loans outstanding in year t, which is calculated as a mean of all the observed P i s in the year. This can be considered as an indicator of the banks' overall lending policy that reflects macroeconomic factors. If every bank independently increases (or decreases) its loans outstanding in industry-year i with probability P t (or 1 − P t ), which is based rationally on macroeconomic factors, the observed value of P i becomes close to P t and the first term will become zero. If, on the other hand, banks collectively increase or decrease loans in an industry-year, the observed value of P i departs from P t . The first term of the equation (1) thus quantifies the extent to which banks' lending policies in an industry-year i deviate from the overall lending policy in the year t.
The overall lending policy P t thus represents the null hypothesis of no herding. Both non-independent corrective increase and decrease amount to a larger value of the first absolute value and the measure itself. It is this sense of herd behavior that the LSV measure tries to capture. As we are interested in the change in banks' lending behavior over the sample period, we obtain in each year a sample mean of the LSV measure among all industries and analyze the time series of the mean.
Note that even if the null hypothesis holds and there exists no herding, the expectation of the first absolute term of LSV i is positive. The last term E|P i − P t | of equation (1) is subtracted so as to normalize the measure and make its mean zero under the null hypothesis of no herding.
Data
The primary data to be used in this paper are loans outstanding to different types of industries, which are available from the Nikkei NEEDS Company (Bank) Data File. Loans to the following eleven industries by individual banks are available: (1) Manufacturing, (2) Agriculture, Forest and Fisheries, (3) Mining, (4) Construction, (5) Wholesale and Retail Trade, (6) Finance and Insurance, (7) Real estate, (8) Transport and Communication (9) Electricity, Gas, Heat supply and Water, (10) Services, and (11) Individuals and others.
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The data set includes two types of commercial banks in Japan. City banks have a main branch office in a big city and operate nationwide as well as multinationally. They are the biggest banks in Japan and mainly deal with bigger businesses. Their lines of operation include not only commercial banking but also some investment and international banking. In contrast, regional banks have their main branch in a smaller city and operate mainly inside the prefectures in which they are located. They are small-or mediumsized banks and are closely connected to local businesses and governments.
11 Table 1 describes the transition of per-bank average loans outstanding for city banks and regional banks.
12 Banks of the former type are on average smaller in number, but bigger in size of loans they extend. These figures reflect the fact that banks of the former type have been playing a dominant role in the Japanese economy. In the analysis that follows, we thus focus mainly on city banks. For comparison purposes, however, we will also investigate regional banks in section 5.
The sample period is from fiscal year 1975 through 2000. This allows us to investigate herd behavior in several interesting periods. Most importantly, the sample period includes the bubble period of the late 1980s through the early 1990s, in which land and stock prices were inflated. As Table 1 demonstrates, outstanding loans had been consistently increasing until this period, but they suddenly stopped expanding afterward.
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Because of the long sample period, the results for the bubble period can be compared with those for other interesting periods. First, the second oil crisis in the late 1970s is included in the sample. Herd behavior might have been followed around this panic year. Second, the sample includes the period of financial liberalization in the 1980s. In this period, Japanese banks had lost their traditional borrowers, who were freed from regulation and obtained other financing sources. As Hoshi and Kashyap [17] and Nakagawa and Uchida [24] show, banks had to expand loans to borrowers with whom they had less information accumulation. Third, the period after the bubble corruption is included in the sample. Herding among Japanese banks in this panic period might be as plausible as that among fund managers in the period of the international currency crisis.
14 Finally, the sample period contains the stagnation period in the 1990s when the Japanese economy had been struggling to escape from its weak economic condition. Banks uniformly decreased loans in this period. We will interpret the results based on this historical background of interest.
Results
The sample means of the LSV measure for city banks obtained for 1975 through 2000 are represented in Table 2 , and depicted in Figure 1 . Table  2 also contains p-values for statistical significance of the estimated coefficients. The statistics are to be explained and interpreted in section 2.4 with theoretical background, since one of them, the Chi-squared statistic, is our innovation.
As shown in Figure 1 , city banks seem to follow a cyclical herding pattern. 15 First, a significant magnitude of herding can be found around 1979, when Japan was hit by the second oil crisis. This result is consistent with our image of banks being frantic to herd in an 'abnormal' circumstance.
As for the first half of the 1980s, the period of financial liberalization, we do not find obvious herding. This is consistent with the results of Uchida and Tsutsui [29] . They found that the degree of competition for city banks became fierce after 1980. Before the bubble began to form, the shape of our Figure  1 looks similar to their Figure 2 which depicts the degree of competition.
A significant extent of herding is observed around the bubble period in the late 1980s. We observe a maximum of 14% of collective deviation from the overall lending policy in the bubble period. A great extent of herding is also observed when the bubble collapsed and stagnation followed in the 1990s. 16 Finally, in the late 1990s, city banks in Japan had come into a period of severe competition due to the financial system reform called the big-bang. Consistent with this background, they ceased to herd after 1997.
Statistical testing of LSV measure 2.4.1 Conventional test and distribution of LSV measure
In this subsection, we focus on the statistical significance of herd behavior detected by the LSV measure. We propose a Chi-squared test which is suitable for small-sample analysis. In some studies in the literature, careful treatment of statistical testing has not been of concern. The focus has only been on the economic significance or the magnitude of the measure.
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In other studies which do mention the statistical significance of the measure, the standard t-test has been conventionally applied. Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny [23] , Kim and Wei [21, 22] , Borensztein and Gelos [7] , and Choe, Kho, and Stultz [9] present the standard errors and even t-values of sample means of the measure. Based on these values, they determine the statistical significance of the measure and thus the existence of herd behavior.
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16 It is also interesting to observe a sudden drop in herding in 1990. Upon close inspection of the LSV measure for each industry in this year, it turns out that almost all the city banks increased loans outstanding to all the industries in this year, which makes P t large and |P i − P t | small. It is almost certain that this unanimous increase was caused by the change in the accounting standard of loans outstanding by industry in fiscal year 1990 (See footnote 13). Thus, the result for 1990 might not be trustworthy. 17 No explicit comments are made about the statistical significance of the measure in Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers [15] or Gelos and Wei [14] . 18 Another interesting attempt is Wermers [31] . He depicts in his Figure 1 an actual (estimated) distribution of the LSV measure and compares it with a simulated one ob-It is highly probable, however, that the conventional test has a considerable small-sample bias in the present paper. We can confirm this simply by investigating the probability distribution of the LSV measure. Suppose that there is no herding for an industry-year i. Then, P i follows a binominal distribution with mean P t and variance P t (1 − P t )/N i . If N i , the number of banks, is sufficiently large, we can approximate this binominal distribution to the normal distribution with the same mean and variance, which is conventionally allowed if N i P t > 5 and N i (1 − P t ) > 5. 19 This approximation implies that the first term of the LSV measure, |P i −P t |, follows a half-normal distribution, and thus the distribution of the measure (1) has a longer tail to the right. Therefore, if we test a sample mean of the LSV measure using the conventional test that is based on normal distribution, the test results might be biased toward accepting the null hypothesis of no herding when we have a small sample. That is, only when there is a large number of industryyears (or stock-quarters), the sample mean approximately follows a normal distribution and the conventional test is reliable.
As far as the existing studies on fund managers are concerned, this condition seems to be satisfied, since they have a large enough number of stockquarters. As for a sample like ours that has a small number of industry-years, however, testing results obtained from the conventional test are not reliable. In the following section, therefore, we devise a test procedure that does not suffer from small-sample bias, which could enhance the test's reliability over the conventional test.
Chi-squared test for LSV measure
Now define a statistic Z i as,
From equation (1), this equals (the non-absolute value of) the first term of the LSV measure which is normalized for its variance to take the value of 1 under the null hypothesis of no herding. From the discussion above, we know that the approximation of Z i ∼ N (0, 1) is allowed when N i P t > 5 and
This leads to the result that
This is the statistic we propose in order to test the significance of the herding detected by the LSV measure. When we test the statistical significance of herding for a group of industry-years Φ (or a sample mean of the LSV measure over Φ), we can use the relationship that
where I is the number of samples (industry-years) included in Φ. Note that as absolute values and squared values correspond to each other, we have a close correspondence between Z 2 i and the LSV measure, and between Z 2 Φ and a sample mean of the LSV measure.
It should be stressed here that in order to derive the probability distribution of the Chi-squared statistic Z 2 i (or the sum Z 2 Φ ), we do not rely on the normal approximation of a sample mean of the LSV measure, which is only justified with a large number of industry-years (i.e. large I). Even if we are interested in herding among a small number of I, as long as the normal approximation of a binominal distribution of P i is allowed, the Chi-squared test based on Z 2 i statistic would be more reliable than the conventional t-test. The use of the Chi-squared test together with the t-test would improve the reliability of the test to detect herding.
Statistical significance of the results
The results with the Chi-squared and the t-tests are presented in Table 2 . For both tests, the results of the statistical significance represented by the pvalues parallel the results represented in Figure 1 . A cyclical herding pattern for city banks is supported from a statistical point of view as well. We can therefore confirm the conclusion in section 2.3 from a statistical point of view.
Note that the two tests reveal some differences. p-values from the t-test are larger in general than those from the Chi-squared test. The conventional test has a bias toward accepting the null hypothesis of no herding. As was expected above, this implies that the Chi-squared test could avoid the smallsample bias of the t-test. 20 We can thus conclude that the conventional t-test is unreliable for smallsample analysis, and that the Chi-squared test could make an improvement over the conventional one. Although the conventional testing is indeed easy and convenient, and appeals to our intuition, it may demonstrate a loss of test efficiency and may bias the result for small samples.
Rationality in herding 3.1 Methodology
Rationality in LSV herding measure
Having detected the existence of herd behavior, we are now interested in investigating in further detail its rationality. As explained in section 2.1 the LSV measure quantifies to what extent banks' behavior to lend to each industry collectively deviates from the overall trend in increasing or decreasing loans outstanding. Since P t is subtracted from P i , the measure does not include banks' rational decisions based on overall macroeconomic conditions. However, as mentioned in the Introduction, this does not necessarily imply that banks are irrational when the LSV measure indicates the existence of herding. Rational banks make lending decisions not only based on overall macroeconomic conditions but also on conditions specific to individual industries. Although P t is subtracted from P i in the measure, the measure could still reflect an increase or decrease in loans outstanding that is based on industry-specific rational factors. For example, if there are growing industries and declining industries, rational banks would collectively increase loans to the former and decrease loans to the latter. The increase or decrease should reflect increased or decreased loan demand as well, which also has nothing to do with banks' irrational behavior. Thus we have to adjust for the deviation from the overall lending policy that is based on industry-specific rational reasons.
Adjusted LSV herding measure
In order to eliminate rational reasons for herding that are industry-specific, we estimate the following equation by the ordinary least squares (OLS).
where X i is a vector of industry-specific control variables.
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i represents the after adjustment deviation from the overall lending policy that cannot be explained by industry-specific factors. In other words, i captures the portion of herding which cannot be explained by rational factors. We can therefore quantify the extent of herding after adjustment by the following measure.
We call this the adjusted LSV herding measure. 22 Averaging this adjusted measure in each year, we can grasp the extent of herding that cannot be explained by rational factors.
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The statistical significance of this measure can be tested in a manner similar to that of LSV i . Define a statistic W i as follows.
As W i asymptotically follows the standard normal distribution under the null hypothesis of no herding, we obtain the following relationship.
where Φ is the relevant group of samples (industry-years), I is the number of samples included in Φ, and K is the number of parameters of the regression (2). 21 Estimation results without a constant term produced similar results. 22 Note that the term E| i | is the same as E|P i − P t |, the second term of the original measure (1). This is because, under the null hypothesis of no herding, P i − aX i follows a binominal distribution with mean P t as does P i in the original measure. 23 One might think of checking rationality using variables representing ex post profitability of each industry, as studies such as Kim and Wei [21, 22] do, rather than running the regression on variables representing ex ante profitability. We did not pursue this possibility because, if we are to judge bank rationality based on ex post profitability, they would no doubt be irrational because of the miserable performance of loans after the bubble period.
Control variables
To retain a reasonable degree of freedom, we use the following three industryspecific variables as variables to further control for rationality. 24 First, we adopt a variable representing the relative magnitude of economic activity of the eleven industries in the Japanese economy. We use the real GDP growth by industry for the ten industries other than 'Individuals and others,' and the growth rate of real final consumption expenditure of households for 'Individuals and others.' These variables are to control for the relative profitability of each industry. The data are available from the Annual Report on National Accounts.
25
Second, land prices are used as a control variable. In Japan, land is highly valued as collateral. In the bubble period, it is often claimed that increased collateral values due to surging land prices contributed to the influx of loan funds into the real estate industry, for example. Thus, we took the index of urban land price as an explanatory variable, which is available from the Japan Real Estate Institute. We used the index only for four industries that are highly likely to be affected by the change in land prices: Construction, Finance, Real estate, and Individual and others. Specifically, we constructed a variable which is a product of the rate of increase in the price index and a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the four industries and 0 for the others.
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Finally, we take into account the idiosyncratic impact of financial liberalization in the 1980s as an institutional factor in herding. The difference in the availability of alternative sources of funds across industries brought about by the liberalization could be proxied by the rate of increase in corporate bonds outstanding by industry. However, as the rate is available only for 24 Note that in each year, we have only 11 samples corresponding to 11 industries. 25 We also considered the use of stock price indices by industry, which is available from the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Because of the mismatch of industry classification and the limited availability of data (only after 1983), we decided not to use them. 26 One might think of introducing the amount of bad loans in the 1990s as a control variable. It is however highly probable that the impact of the bad loan problem in the 1990s was uniform among loans to all the industries and is thus reflected in P t . In fact, it turns out (in Figure 2) that most of the herding for city banks in the 1990s was eliminated by the three control variables introduced above. We therefore concluded that the variables we had used were sufficient and there was no need to incorporate a variable representing bad loans. Note that P t should reflect not only bad loans but also any other macroeconomic factors that evenly affect loans to all the industries total bonds outstanding and not for those by industry, we constructed a variable which, for Manufacturing and Wholesale, equals the rate of increase in total bonds outstanding, and is zero for the others. 27 Total corporate bonds outstanding are the sum of outstanding corporate bonds, asset-backed bonds, and convertible bonds. They are available from the Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly issued by the Bank of Japan.
All three control variables are utilized in the relevant years. We also tried the same variables with a one-year lag. However, they had considerably weaker explanatory power.
Results
The sample means of herding measures adjusted for rational factors are presented in Table 3 . Figure 2 depicts the adjusted measures together with the unadjusted measures. The difference between the solid and the dotted lines represents the portion of herding which was adjusted by industry-specific rational factors.
Most of the herd behavior by city banks can be explained on rational grounds. As for herding in the late 1970s and the early 1990s, Figure 2 shows us that purely rational herding was dominant, although the Chi-squared test results tell us that the herding was still statistically significant. We can therefore conclude from an economic point of view that city banks' herding was rational in most of the sample period.
The interesting exception is the late 1980s, however, which is exactly the period when the asset price bubble was formed. Even after adjusting for rational factors, we still observe a large extent of herding in Figure 2 . As Tab e 1 shows, city banks have been playing a bigger role in supplying funds in Japan. The results here thus imply that irrational bank behavior in the late 1980s could have contributed to the accumulation of bad loans. If banks had practiced rational lending behavior based more on available information, they might have been able to avoid accumulation of bad loans.
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Finally, it is worth noting the difference in the two testing results. The 27 As Nakagawa and Uchida [24] demonstrate, loan shares to these two industries, which had been banks' main customers (traditional industries) decreased drastically after financial liberalization. It is therefore highly probable that firms in these two industries benefited from financial liberalization and gained independence from banks. 28 Note that the adjusted measure drops in 1990. The reason would be the same as that for the unadjusted measure. See footnote 16. conventional t-test produces larger p-values than the Chi-squared test does. This result is more apparent than that observed in Table 2 . We could therefore confirm the earlier statement that the Chi-squared test reduces the smallsample bias of the conventional test.
Robustness checks
The results obtained thus far imply that city banks might have been exceptionally irrational in the bubble period, which is consistent with the hypothesis of "irrational herding only during the abnormal period." Since city banks have been dominant in the Japanese loan market, their behavior must have had a large impact on the Japanese economy. In this section, we conduct further analysis to check the robustness of the results obtained in the last two sections. We will see that the overall conclusions are unchanged.
LSV measure by industry in the bubble period
It is our common belief that there was a huge influx of loans from city banks to industries like construction, real estate, and non-bank. In Figure 3 , we depict city banks' average increase in outstanding loans by industry from 1986 through 1989. Different from our common belief, the top two industries which experienced the biggest increase are Services and Individual and others, which are followed by Real estate and Finance and Insurance. As Nakagawa and Uchida [24] indicate, those two industries are considered as relatively new customers for banks after traditional borrowers gained independence from bank loans due to financial liberalization. Loans to these industries increased, whereas those to traditional borrowers such as Manufacturing and Wholesale decreased or did not increase very much. These points can be confirmed by Figure 4 , which depicts city banks' average loans outstanding by industry.
Based on this discussion, we investigate if these increases stem from herd behavior among city banks. We calculated a sample mean of the LSV measure by industry over the period from 1986 through 1989. The results are shown in Figure 5 . As for new borrowers such as Real estate, Services, and Individual and others, we can see that the increase in the loans outstanding represented in Figure 3 can be attributed to herd behavior. In other words, city banks had been collectively deviating from each year's average lending policy to lend to these industries. Furthermore, a large portion of this herding is not based on rational grounds. A decrease in loans to Manufacturing is also identified as herding. Although most of the decrease was based on rational grounds, a great extent of irrational herding still remained. 29 We should stress that we see, on average, consistent irrational herding among industries. Of particular interest is the result that in spite of the difference in the direction and the amount of changes in loans outstanding (Figure 3) , the extent of irrational herding was not very different among industries (right columns in Figure 5 ).
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In summary, the results in this section confirm those obtained in the previous sections. Even a closer look at the behavior of city banks reveals irrational herding in the late 1980s. In spite of the difference in circumstances each industry had faced, which could have naturally led to different results by industry, a large extent of irrational herding was still observed across industries. It is therefore highly likely that the behavior of city banks in this period might have been abnormal and contributed to the accumulation of bad loans.
Weighted LSV measure
The analysis thus far is based on a simple mean of the LSV measure over 11 industries in each year of the sample period. There are however great discrepancies in loans outstanding by industry. For example, as Figure 4 confirms, city banks had large outstanding loans to the Manufacturing and Wholesale and Retail Trade, but very little to Mining and Agriculture, Forest and Fisheries. It might not therefore be appropriate to use a simple mean of the LSV measure. We then calculated a weighted mean LSV measure, whose weight for each industry is loans outstanding to the industry divided by total loans outstanding. Figure 6 plots the simple and weighted mean LSV measures before and after adjustment. Comparing the two mean measures (both before and after adjustment), we can confirm that qualitative results from a simple mean 29 Mining is exceptional in the extent of herding, and so are Agriculture, Forest and Fisheries in the sign of the measure. Although it is difficult to interpret these results, judging from the amount of total loans outstanding (Figure 4 ), these industries can be disregarded. 30 Again, Mining and Agriculture, Forest and Fisheries are the exceptions, but they could be negligible in our discussion due to the small number of outstanding loans. measure obtained in section 2.3 still hold here. Quantitatively, the weighted means fluctuate to a greater extent than the simple means. However, the conclusion of irrationality only during the bubble period is still confirmed.
Herding among regional banks
In this section, we apply the LSV measures to regional banks and compare the results with those for city banks. The simple and weighted mean LSV measures obtained for regional banks (before and after adjustment) are presented in Table 4 and Figure 7 .
For regional banks, the results from a simple mean LSV measure (the gray solid line in Figure 7 ) demonstrate the existence of consistent herding. We observe about 10% of collective deviation from the overall lending policy in each year. The consistent herding is also significant from a statistical point of view (Table 4) . We can reject the null hypothesis of no herding for the entire sample period.
In contrast to the results for city banks, herd behavior is still consistently observed for regional banks even after the adjustment (the gray dotted line in Figure 7) . 31 We can see that with some exceptions around 1980, only a small part of herding was due to rational factors. Still a large measure of adjusted herding manifests itself consistently. The p-values from the Chisquared test (Table 4 ) reveal that they are significant not only economically but also statistically. We could therefore conclude that it is highly probable that regional banks had been consistently following irrational herd behavior. This makes a good contrast with the results for city banks, which represents irrationality mainly in the late 1980s.
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Finally, the weighted mean measure is always smaller than the simple 31 As a control variable representing land price for regional banks, the index of land price for the region outside the six largest urban areas is used. 32 One might wonder that a great extent of herding is observed for regional banks even after the adjustment not because they are irrational but because they are making lending decisions based on regional economic conditions. However, we do not have to control for region specific factors, since herding based on region specific factors is not captured in the LSV measure at all. The LSV measure captures the difference between a proportion of banks who increased loans in an industry-year (P i ) and an overall lending policy (P t ) in the year. What we have to control for is a rational factor affecting this difference, but the difference depends only on industry-and year-specific factors (X i ) and not on region-specific factors.
mean measure until 1985 (after adjustment). This underscores the rationality of regional banks in the years around 1980. The difference between the simple and weighted mean measures indicates that in this period, the level of the adjusted LSV measure is smaller for industries with larger weights, while the level is larger for those with smaller weights. It is therefore safe to adopt the result from the weighted mean measure and conclude that rationality of regional banks had been observed to some extent before the bubble period of the late 1980s. In contrast, for the period after 1985, we essentially confirm the conclusion that consistent irrational herding had existed for regional banks.
The results of consistent herding among regional banks are in line with the results obtained in Uchida and Tsutsui [29] . They report that regional banks were consistently under less stringent competitive pressure than city banks throughout the period. They might thus have been able to afford to herd.
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Conclusion
For the purpose of investigating herd behavior among Japanese banks, we calculated the herding measure invented by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny [23] . The results obtained in this paper give us information sufficient to answer the question raised in the Introduction. First of all, city banks had followed a cyclical pattern of herding. After adjusting for rational factors that are contained in the original measure, herd behavior by city banks was mainly due to rational factors. However, the results indicative of irrational herding were still obtained in the late 1980s. The existence of irrational herding was also confirmed by a closer look at city banks' lending behavior by industry in the late 1980s. These results imply that their irrational herd behavior in this period might have contributed to the bad loan problem in the 1990s. This made a good contrast with the results for regional banks which had consistently followed irrational herd behavior from the mid-1980s.
There is an interesting issue that remains unchallenged in this paper. Although we were able to answer the three questions raised in the Introduction, investigation of the effect of irrational herding is not perfectly clear in this paper. Further investigation is anticipated about how the irrational behavior has contributed to the accumulation of bad loans.
The financial system in Japan has long been bank-oriented, and banks have been playing a big role in the economy. The existence of herding among Japanese banks shown in this paper is thus as important as that among fund managers in the U.S., whose financial system is market-oriented. Of particular interest is the result that city banks might have followed irrational herd behavior in the late 1980s. The present paper demonstrated the possibility of applying the method of analysis for herd behavior among fund managers to that among banks. In order to obtain some lesson from the Japanese banking crisis, it would be interesting to apply the same analysis to other bank-oriented economies. F i n a n c e a n d I n s u r a n c e R e a l E s t a t e T r a n s p o r t a n d F i n a n c e a n d I n s u r a n c e R e a l E s t a t e T r a n s p o r t a n d F i n a n c e a n d I n s u r a n c e R e a l E s t a t e T r a n s p o r t a n d 
